Mayor of Amsterdam and chairman of the Amsterdam-Amstelland Safety Region
Halsema and the Rule of Rescue: a fatal state of mind
The core
Marianne Zwagerman asked the question that hangs over every interrogation: how could this mass psychosis not be stopped? How could someone like Halsema - with access to all information, with sharp analytical skills, with the right rule of law framework and with visible conscience - continue to cooperate?
The answer that Halsema herself gave is more revealing than she probably realized: despite her fierce and well-thought-out criticism, she thought and still thinks the decisions were largely good in the end. Why? Because the ICUs were full and people were dying. This wasn't an issue An order is an order or blind subservience to the council of ministers, as Zwagerman assumes. No, Halsema himself was deeply convinced of the necessity.
This makes her the textbook example of Rule of Rescue: the psychological and moral mechanism by which administrators intervene disproportionately to save visible, acute victims, while ignoring future, diffuse but very real damage. Orr and Wolff (2014) already described it: retrieving a drowning child from the river here and now feels like an absolute moral duty, but preventing ten anonymous drownings over ten years feels abstract.
The constantly communicated threat of mass medical horror in the ICUs had a paralyzing effect on Halsema's critical thinking skills. To avert this alleged horror, she blindly accepted measures without any scientific basis: the 1.5 meter distance, face masks in the open air, the introduction of 2G and 3G. In doing so, she neglected the utilitarian principle that the diffuse, future damage — the destroyed mental health of an entire generation of young people, the delayed care for thousands of heart and cancer patients — constituted a medical catastrophe many times greater than the crisis she was trying to avert.
The ultimate irony: the fear of medical horror led to a system that itself produced horror. Regular patients with a good prognosis were displaced by corrupted triage — regular medical ethics made way for a Corona-first policy in favor of multimorbid corona patients with a very short life expectancy. According to Prof. Armand Girbes (intensivist VUMC), never before have so many patients died so completely senselessly and under miserable conditions in the ICUs as during the corona period. And that's what makes it so serious.
Candid, but loyal to the bone
Halsema differed significantly from almost all other witnesses in one respect: she spoke without saying anything. Her criticism of the policy was sharp and concrete:
- Young people and the vulnerable were seriously neglected. This was visible and tangible especially in the regions — a point that fits seamlessly with what Kalverboer argued earlier.
- The measures took on idiotic, inconsistent forms: the curfew, meetings until midnight, bans on gatherings outside - unenforceable, disproportionate and, according to her, also downright ineffective and therefore nonsensical.
- The transfer of power to the security regions was problematic and unlawful. The presidents of the regions in fact sideline the mayors and municipal councils of the regional municipalities; democratic control was completely lacking. At first she thought this was justified due to the uncertainty and the major medical crisis, but with each extension it became more problematic. When national laws replaced emergency regulations, things only got worse: top-down control, regions only had to implement constitutional law. No more influence, no contradiction.
- From that moment on, the measures became increasingly repressive, with an obsessive emphasis on enforcement. The House of Representatives certainly did not play a good role in this - it gave it an extra zing. While the rule of law should normally protect citizens against the government, the government itself became an instrument of repression.
All analyzed razor sharply by Halsema.
Crisis inflation and the security council
An important point that Halsema sharply pointed out was the phenomenon of crisis inflation (de term die de Commissie gebruikte). De overheid ontwikkelde tijdens Corona de neiging om álles een crisis te noemen, zodat er harder en makkelijker kon en kan worden ingegrepen via het veiligheidsberaad — zoals bij de "asielcrisis". Grip-4-scenario's werden houtje-touwtje met noodverordeningen afgehandeld. Zeer kwalijk volgens Halsema: gebrek aan democratische controle en een overheid die zich tegen de eigen burgers keert.
Museumplein as a turning point
Halsema had grote moeite met het schoonspuiten van de "lieve mensen" op het Museumplein. Ze analyseerde scherp dat dít het moment was waarop de bevolking er genoeg van kreeg — en waarop een groot, blijvend wantrouwen tegen de overheid en de bestuurlijke elite ontstond. Ze rekent zichzelf daar nadrukkelijk toe.
Maar hier wringt het. Ze zag het gebeuren, ze analyseerde het feilloos, ze voelde gewetensnood — en ze voerde toch uit. Haar verweer: de maatregelen waren democratisch tot stand gekomen, en als het lokale bestuur onderling gaat ruziën bij toenemend protest en polarisatie, maak je de situatie alleen maar erger. Een streep trekken of aftreden? Effectief zou het niet zijn geweest, want haar plek zou "gewoon" door iemand anders zijn ingenomen. Kijk naar Mona Keijzer: die trad af, en het beleid veranderde geen millimeter.
That is a pragmatic argument. But it is also an excuse that declares any resistance pointless in advance. If the mayor of the capital, with her stature and public platform, could not have made a difference — who could?
What she didn't see — or didn't want to see
Ondanks al die scherpe analyses nam Halsema keer op keer de foute afslag: het Museumplein schoonvegen, de 1,5 meter in de parken en de avondklok handhaven, 3G invoeren. Geen fundamentele kritiek op de irrationaliteit van de 1,5 meter, de vaccinatiedrang of de disproportionaliteit van het hele bouwwerk. Ze was het zelfs met het grootste deel van het beleid gewoon eens, zo benadrukte ze expliciet. Sterker nog: ze wilde in de zomer van 2020 een mondkapjesplicht. Buiten! "Baat het niet, dan schaadt het niet," zei ze over mondkapjes. Het sluiten van parken noemde ze desastreus — maar géén verkeerde beslissing. Ze baseerde zich bovendien deels op het Red Team, met zijn alarmistische en in feite nog eenzijdiger medische insteek dan het OMT.
De weerbarstige realiteit dat mensen op de IC lagen dood te gaan, liet voor haar "geen ruimte voor vrij gesprek". Een uitspraak die niet valt te rijmen met haar eigen kritiek dat het OMT een te eenzijdig medische focus had en het kabinet te eenzijdig besliste — ze was het dus zelf eens met die eenzijdigheid.
You would expect more critical and consistent thinking from someone of her intellectual caliber. That is exactly what the Rule of Rescue is in action: the acute, visible suffering suppresses any room for critical reflection on the measures themselves. Also at Halsema. Better said: even at Halsema.
The tragedy: disproportionality without a weighting framework
Femke Halsema was the most candid, most self-critical and most intellectually honest witness to date. She had troubles of conscience and did not hide it. And yet she continued to cooperate; Still, she ultimately thought they were good decisions.
There was certainly a (vague) sense of disproportionality, also in her. But she couldn't make it hard; she couldn't come to terms with it for herself. Because disproportionality without an objective assessment framework is a hollow concept — and is immediately victimized as soon as there is even one person in need. The utilitarian thinking - ten future deaths weigh ten times as much as one death now - was crushed. By everyone: Halsema, Slob, Kalverboer and the entire system.
Marianne Zwagerman, Maurice de Hond and many other critics of the policy do not understand this mechanism either. People look for external causes: malicious intent, conspiracy, incompetence, international forces. But Halsema showed that it is worse; is deeper; is more personal. Convinced, intelligent, principled people made disproportionate decisions because they thought that was the way they had to be. Good intentions, no malice, no stupidity, no lack of sense of civil liberties, and great discomfort about the loss of the rule of law — and yet those wrong decisions.
The Rule of Rescue is seductive because it disguises itself as moral urgency. But moral urgency without a utilitarian test is moral arbitrariness. As long as that insight does not penetrate, committees, processes, protocols, hearings and recommendations will continue to treat symptoms. Medical preparation must be improved, behavioral scientists must have a seat at the table, local and national democracy must continue to function — all true. But the core remains untouched.
How it can be done: cost-benefit analyses
The real lesson of Halsema's interrogation is that a system in which even the most critical minds remain captive to the Rule of Rescue needs to be fundamentally overhauled. This starts with recognizing that good intentions and full ICUs are not a license to suspend utilitarian thinking - which was common practice at the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport before Corona in almost every policy choice. A cost-benefit analysis must be made of every measure, and certainly of drastic measures. Not afterwards, but beforehand.
That is possible, because it has been done: officials from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy made such an analysis at the end of March 2020, together with officials from VWS and Finance, as they were used to with major policy proposals. But the study was not allowed to be made public. Their calculation was dramatic and in retrospect quite precise: approximately 100,000 years of life would be saved by the lockdown, and approximately 620,000 would be lost. Exactly as Orr and Wolff argued in 2014.
This scenario will repeat itself in every large-scale crisis, as long as the Rule-of-Rescue thinking in the minds of policy makers, media and citizens is not replaced by a utilitarian approach.
Sources:
Orr & Wolff (2014), Reconciling cost-effectiveness with the rule of rescue: the institutional division of moral labour.
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Policy (end of March 2020). Social cost/benefit analysis SCBA COVID-19 measures, version 1 and 2. (Prediction: approx. 100,000 life years gained vs. approx. 620,000 life years lost due to lockdown policy.) Min EZK Maatsch Cost Benefit Analysis 1 and 2.pdf
Background article/FAQ upon publication of EZK cost/benefit analysis and the Rule of Rescue.
This review has also been added to the collective post PEC: notes by Jan van der Zanden
I don't believe a word of Halsema's arguments. Two points why:
– the major BLM demonstration in 2020, which she attended herself, not for a moment afraid of a deadly virus
– her response to the report by Nils Melzer, UN Special Rapporteur.
By the way: search for his name and you will practically only find the smear campaign against this man by the media and police unions. Search for “special rapporteur Nils Melzer Halsema” and you will read that this mayor sent a letter to him. I cannot find that letter on the virtually closed-off internet, but this was stated in the newspaper about this, among other things:
In her letter, Halsema drew the rapporteur's attention to the "controlled and rule-of-law actions of the Amsterdam police during demonstrations" and "the importance of judging an incident on the basis of thorough and weighted information." She also assured Melzer “of our obvious readiness to provide support should he decide to conduct an investigation.”
[end quote]
Ines van Bokhoven has clearly expressed how controlled and constitutional the police's actions were in this blog post: https://opiniez.com/2022/01/08/femke-waar-ben-je-in-hemelsnaam-mee-bezig/inesvanbokhoven/
Nils Melzer has left early for another position, possibly under pressure. Furthermore, it bled to death, because the mainstream media and their handlers could not tolerate criticism. And still not.
My opinion is that Halsema is very good at lying and pretending to be empathetic. It was not just one time that police resorted to violence against peaceful demonstrators. If she had truly had empathy, then once it would have been enough.
Just listened to some stuttering Grapperhaus... It is shocking the state of politics.
I don't think you read or understood my argument properly.
Halsema herself did not believe in all those measures, she thought they were “idiotic” [her words].
But she was loyal to democracy. And that's why she took those idiotic measures anyway.
I also know that police action has often not gone well. The key question is whether there was a warning to “leave” before intervention with force or hot water cannon. Here the observations/facts/accounts differ.
Whatever the case may be: Halsema found all those police actions just as gruesome, nasty, etc. as you did.
And what I blame her for is: even though she saw and thought all that, she still "just" continued with it. Not out of badness, but out of supposed goodness to keep the ICs empty. Well, we also know that this was largely nonsense: ICUs were largely occupied by patients who would normally never be sent there because there was no chance. But I suspect Halsema still doesn't know that. The Commission is still not looking for this abuse in the policy. While it is also very crucial.
As far as the overcapacity in the ICUs is concerned, Prof. Armand Girbes has some things to clarify. It would be nice if he could also speak. Not enough attention was paid to critical physicians; they were even fired or ridiculed. Scary development.
For sure. IC capacity was simply wasted on pointless recordings (says Girbes). Almost everything that happened during this “medical crisis” was done wrong.
What still remains underexposed is idiotic policies surrounding "access", where social interaction became a problem for the unvaccinated.
The discriminatory effect of this has sown great distrust among many democratically minded citizens. Perhaps something will come to light during the session with Mona Keijzer
Read the news about the bubble graphs. Substack Robin de Boer and others Finally they have been released! You still have to pay attention to how things will be “explained”.
Panic to the max 3
The survey with its focus on the process provides little to learn.
Mi. In the Netherlands (okay, in retrospect) there is a triple, mutually reinforcing panic.
Firstly, there is the fear that the IC capacity, which has been reduced by politics, may well be insufficient (lesson: make sure it is in order and in the event of a first wave of panic you will avoid feeling forced to introduce all kinds of restrictive measures for civil rights and you will prevent excess mortality (see neighboring country Germany during the first wave).
Secondly, the panic that we are dealing with a SEVERE acute respiratory syndrome cf. Sarscov1, which (as Brabant research hospitals showed) was also more easily transmissible in March 2020.
(This panic was repeated when the English/SA variant was reported and with omicron, resulting in curfew and omicron lockdown respectively).
The result was that models were filled with the alleged IFR of a supposedly more serious variant and the contagiousness was estimated to be higher, resulting in well-known Wallinga hospital tsunami pictures.
Intervention was inevitable.
In short, it turned out that it was not that serious, but just to be sure, it was not taken into account. In short, another repetition of PANIC. After the first trauma, without reflexion, the procedure was automatically repeated twice.
This panic was fueled by gain of function research conducted (also in the Netherlands, Fouchier), which suggested that it would be possible to make a virus with a high IFR also highly contagious (in my opinion nonsense, but enough to ignite panic 2).
For a critical review, see the subsequent message below.
The third panic was encouraged by Rutte's red line: no one (read: no sick elderly, weak people who test positive for corona) should die outside the hospital.
This rule of rescue or perhaps better: Rule of Rutte ensured that he and De Jonge took the chair of the ICU doctor, overruled them and thus brought about an infarction in the ICU that, in combination with panic 1, apparently made the need ('legitimization') of all kinds of civil rights restrictive measures and violent actions necessary.
Fortunately, we had the 'vaccine' as an apparent lifebuoy. In addition to his placebo effect, he has unfortunately also caused a lot of ongoing damage (presumably additional deaths).
Fouchier's twisting. Seems political.
https://www.psandman.com/articles/Fouchier.htm
You're absolutely right. And the bad thing is that finding the truth about the scientific side, the medical side, the models, etc. does not get off the ground at all.
So this element, which is certainly to a large extent the cause of the panic, the completely ineffective and therefore nonsensical measures and the overflow of ICs, remains in the air.
This was not discussed in any of the interrogations. And I'm afraid it won't be discussed either. This should have been discussed in detail with Van Dissel and Gommers with the perspective of Armand Girbes and Maurice de Hond, among others. Maurice is still coming; hopefully he will be given the space to detonate all the scientific nonsense. But it's too much for one interrogation. I counted 91 policy errors. It is still far too much about the process instead of the content.
Isn't it all about cash flows again? I don't think so...
What might have prevented (nothing is certain and absolute) much suffering and escalation?
like hell, do some independent research into what exactly we are dealing with...
= what kind of virus: market (natural) or lab (processed with gain-of-function).
Recognition and investigation of this possibility. The lab version is now available
more plausible if not proven. That could have strongly influenced the approach.
= do not immediately check off alternative medication, but investigate and apply it. (Dr. Elens)
* 1st line more active, less burden on hospitals and ICU
* probably more recoveries, less mortality
* more clarity about virus behavior and future variants. more contagious, no
dangerous(er).
* long-term benefits: stop lab tinkering, pharma in a different light, influence on healthcare system
= government should exercise more neutrality and independence; more clarity, explanation. People want
knowing and understanding what is going on and what is going on.
*expose networks, lobby and interests (money flows, cost-benefit analyses)
*exchange of visions, knowledge and research from various perspectives is necessary. Dominance
and tenacity will always escalate in the long run, that's a sliding scale.
* do everything to openly remove doubt, but doubt is there, undoubtedly exists
not…
* tackling mis- and disinformation through openness, conspiracies is limited system thinking, is over-
accuse again and again. It's about perspectives and ideologies. Different perspective is not equal
a conspiracy.
* recognize limitations of modulation, datasets and algorithms are preferred.
* Making (dis)propotionality 'hard' is always difficult, which is precisely why broad consultation is necessary. To
to be able to conduct 'honest' and sincere actions and policies.
In this way, the 'Rule of Rescue' reflex can dim somewhat earlier (through the above-mentioned 'critical reflection'), without losing its 'natural goodness'.
“Convinced, intelligent, principled people made disproportionate decisions because they thought that was the way they had to be. '
This is true.
Whether the solution comes with weighted objective utilitarian thinking is… unlikely. Because what is objective? Even here on this critical blog we cannot find an answer: for example, what is objectively a 'virus'? -And so that's more threatening stuff (having that whole war on terror in the back of my mind).
Kantian, deontological, thinking in the golden rule of 'What you do not want to happen to you, do not do to others' would have made the problem much easier to solve. In fact, if those bright minds had thought of that in March 2020, not a single measure (such as 3G, curfew, etc.) would have been implemented.
Will there be any kind of apology to those who, post March 2020, had correctly identified the 'danger' and acted accordingly and, for example, were swept off a square on the orders of a mayor? Or are 'people' not ready for that yet?
Dear Willem,
I urge you to read Orr & Wolff's article. It is precisely deontological thinking and the biblical statement “what you do not want... ” that lead to morally completely reprehensible outcomes in a multitude of crises.
I'm not going to repeat Orr & Wolff here. Read that. I think you will then be convinced that utilitarianism and the division of moral labor will solve the problem in this case. It's not an easy thing to do. But mandatory reading for policymakers.
A comment about Mona Keijzer's dismissal. You say that action made no difference, the sensible policy continued as usual. That's right, but I don't think it's an argument to say that resistance has no effect. It had no effect because Mona Keijzer was the only one. The rest, like Halsema, were in a straitjacket, a collectivist way of thinking that they probably believed themselves. Now that she looks back with some distance, the madness of her views at the time slowly dawns on her. She is now trying to clean up her street in a devious way. Mona Keijzer's example should have been followed. The lap swans did not dare.
I write exactly what you say here, slightly different. Of course, protesting and then being forced to resign ultimately makes sense. But usually not directly...
Then I misinterpreted that, for which I apologize. Thank you for these thorough publications. It must take a lot of time. I find it very interesting to try to understand what was going on with those people at that time. I'm on holiday now so I think I read through it too quickly.
Very readable article Jan. We don't always agree, but this piece is worthy of NRC.
Thanks. NRC will never publish this, or perhaps in 50 years...
It goes way too much against their ideology.
I can follow what you indicate very well. I can also fully agree with your analysis of Halsema's behavior.
Where things start to bother me is when it comes to denying that there has been a struggle.
All the people who have been interrogated conceal the pressure exerted on them by three people. Together with their fear, this pressure has caused them to go against their conscience.
They soothe that conscience afterwards with “wipes” for the bleeding.
You say that Halsema had harsh criticism of the policy.
In fact, that only became apparent from this interrogation. Had this interrogation not taken place, we would not have known this.
To me it also means that she has not internalized herself, her behavior and the influence it had on people at the time.
Presumably also because it causes too much pain to face this.
However, we will NEVER learn from what happened if the people responsible continue to do this and clear themselves of all blame.
Her later actions also show me that she has not (yet) learned from this period. Was it also the Rule of Rescue that sent its reactions after the riots/swatting Jews when Tel Aviv played Macabbi in Amsterdam?
I largely agree with your cmt.
It had been known for a long time that Halsema had difficulty with the policy.
For me, a negative surprise was that she essentially thought the policy was good. I thought she was even more critical. So she largely supported enforcement.
Attn. the “battle”. It had also been clear for a long time that the Rutte/De Jonge duo were the driving forces behind the aggressive containment policy. The others followed along. If they had been at the controls, things would probably have been handled a lot more mildly. Because their inner doubt had gotten in the way of the disproportionate measures.
And I haven't seen a single responsible witness who has really recognized that what happened was wrong. Not even Kalverboer and Luijckx.
Only Romy Quint was fundamentally critical. But he wasn't at the controls...
And Marjolijn Sonnema admits that the NCTV was (is) at the controls. Who controls the NCTV? Hard-working entrepreneurs are again (still) at a disadvantage. The stories of our personal contacts with young people with well-run companies who have been enormously financially affected by the so-called climate policy (in this case the code red day) are heartbreaking. Only costs and no benefits for humans and nature does not benefit from this either. Rule of rescue has gone completely crazy or just an insane show of power... And in the meantime they all have a wood stove (Mrs. Bromet, fly from hotter to hotter (Mr. Jetten and many others), etc.
Very weak excuse from Halsema to justify all the misery she has caused. This interrogation once again only indicates that she is not sharp at all and has no spine whatsoever. The arguments that Jan mentions in the piece are “The ICs are full”
Well, that's quite an argument. If anyone had studied this for even an hour, they would know that it is not a valid argument. This is just disinterest and stupidity. Jan keeps writing that our administrators are intelligent and then keeps coming up with explanations as to why they make stupid decisions that seriously harm citizens, but the thought that they are simply not that smart at all should not be mentioned?
This is not the first time you have written a piece and attributed things to coincidence, mass psychosis, an error or something else. How can you see something with clarity and then allow it to happen and approve it? Because isn't the mayor the boss in her own city, as you say?
And then we come to point two. “The measures were taken democratically, and if the local government starts arguing among themselves due to increasing protests and polarization, you will only make the situation worse.”
If anyone could make a difference, it is of course our directors. Make the situation worse? That's exactly what she has done now. She has made the situation very serious. She saw it but did it anyway. Probably because she was not allowed to decide for herself or did not try hard enough because when a group of demonstrators was trapped and rounded up in the streets behind the museum square, another group was allowed to demonstrate. And this has not happened once, police actions are always discussed with the mayor.
Anyway, let's just get another mayor. It doesn't make any difference, does it?
The essence was not conveyed well.
She is intelligent. But she was also captivated by the Rule of Rescue and convinced that measures were necessary. And she thought some of the measures were idiotic.
Finally, she believed that there should be unity in the administration and that democratically made decisions should be implemented.
Based on those principles, she partly came into conflict with herself. So she did a number of things in terms of enforcement that she fully supported and partly because it was necessary based on her principles, but with which she actually did not agree. But she had considerably less difficulty with that than Grapperhaus.
You're absolutely right: these kinds of people, who were at the controls and at least partially saw through the idiocy, could have made the difference. But with the exception of Mona Keijzer, they did not. And so the partly completely nonsensical and largely disproportionate policy lasted more than 2 years.
I do not expect that De Jonge and Rutte, the two main drivers behind this policy, will show any insight into their grotesque failure during this survey... I expect they will confirm again and again that it was difficult, tough, major dilemmas, a broad assessment, but that this was the only possible and necessary thing they could do. See my review by Hanneke Schipper, in which a simple qaly calculation shows that this is complete nonsense.