Drip virology, zoonosis and disproportionate measures fit together seamlessly

The stubbornness with which our government virologists continue to deny evidence-based facts has given the impression that we are dealing with a petrified field. Or with an unfortunate selection of incompetent officials. Think of the droplet theory and the zoonosis theory. Where does this tenacity come from, is it really a lack of advancing insight or is there more to it? Spoiler: There's much, much more to it. The drippers and the zoonati serve a common purpose: the virus outbreak had to be eliminated immediately from the very beginning at all costs. We need this to go away. Now. And once such a path has been taken, the point-of-no-return is soon over. So that line is being continued, even now that everything is actually already on the table. The result: fear, lockdowns, curfews, threats, isolation, vaccination coercion, forgery, dirty and harmful vaccines, a legendary economic downturn, the failure to carry out motions and FOI requests, far too many deaths and, of course, billions disappeared, in the Netherlands alone. There must be something underlying this. How does it all fit together?

That's the basic idea. And a brave little virus that could not be tamed and that could be turned up or down at will with a PCR test. If you find it interesting, read the extensive story below. Or look at maurice.nl, he summed up the article neatly, although he did not adopt the most controversial and conspiracy-ridden element. That is why I have emphasised that essence once again in 'It's worse than you think‘

The why of zoonosi

It will come as no surprise that the zoonosis theory is so popular among virologists. These specialists and their investors in the virus industry (viroscientists, pharmaceutical companies, health institutes, the military) are desperately clinging to a zoonotic origin of SARS-CoV-2 in the lab leak discussion. In doing so, they indirectly defend virus research in which viruses are modified to see if and how they become more dangerous to humans. These viruses are built because in this way we prepare ourselves for combating them, should nature come up with the same idea as the researchers, is the noble thought.

It is worth noting that this is exactly what has happened according to the virologists: nature has fabricated exactly what was predicted by the virus researchers. So even if you go along with their reasoning, it doesn't seem like we got much out of the insider information.

Why the parties involved continue to deny a possible lab accident is obvious, at first glance: an 'accident' that causes a global disaster, you don't want to have anything to do with that. But there's a lot more to it. The health care agencies (Fauci, NIH, FDA, White House, secret services) absolutely do not want to be exposed for unlawful use of their mandates. Not even for treason. They won't admit at any price that they were aware of a) life-threatening bio-military research, b) for which they gave America's biggest adversary, the Chinese, money as well. Everything happened under the radar, and for good reason. The government paid through an NGO, which in turn channeled the money to China. In any case, that had to be kept out of the public eye. Didn't work.

Acknowledging that state of affairs would not only mean the end of a lucrative branch of viro-science. It reaches much further into the industrial-military virus complex, including the pharmaceutical companies, the regulators and the government officials who operate in it and have contributed – sometimes in a personal capacity. This is where personal liability comes into play and behaviour that can be described as criminal, even involving human lives. And not just a few.

Through all kinds of avenues, from scientific journals to social media, the executors (the virologists) have pulled out the registers from pangolin to raccoon dog: it had to be a natural virus, otherwise it would be over and done with both the American-Chinese collaborators and the livelihoods of the viro-industrialists. The importance of the pharmaceutical companies goes without saying, they profit from every epidemic and in turn fund virological research.

The virologists involved hoped to be able to invoke 'scientific cooperation at the service of the health of the world's population' and why should this not be allowed to be done in an American-Chinese way? After all, it is science, this is not about the chip industry where, for example, restrictions are imposed on ASML, when it comes to supplies to China. Because cooperation with China is a sensitive issue, especially in America.

And military aspects? The involvement and interest of both the American Academy of Military Medical Science and the Chinese Military Academy of Medicine participated, didn't that give you pause for thought?

No, that was no association at all for virologists. Because there were often officials in green uniforms with berets or caps on? No, that's just not an association for a scientist.

The blind panic immediately after the outbreak is quite imaginable. Suddenly, we see people who have been pleasing the world's most powerful conglomerates for a long time and who break out in a sweat after a screw-up of their affairs that they could have known (and actually knew) in advance that things would go wrong.

We knew the panic reaction with which the fire had to be put out immediately. The Chinese had good advice and so all our socially responsible protocols and accumulated knowledge were thrown overboard. The virus had to be contained. That got completely out of hand. In order to get the necessary coercive measures through in the Western world, fear had to be sown, people had to be terrified. The severity of the virus was greatly exaggerated and it remained so, even when it was already clear that the lethality was more in the direction of flu than in the direction of Ebola. The WHO was frightened (Tedros only later realized what was really going on), politicians were frightened – intervene, intervene, intervene!

The vaccine pharmaceutical companies were put under pressure. They therefore started to set conditions such as turnover guarantees and indemnification against damage. Of course, our governments participated, because the EU participated, because America participated. Of course, America had to because it was up to its neck in it, through Fauci and the NIH. Fortunately, the EU was able to arrange things quickly through Van der Leyen's network. The contracts have signed for a turnover guarantee. That would be a waste of billions if a cure were to be introduced in the meantime. That also explains something. That way, everything fits together better than in other scenarios I've seen. I call it a scenario and not a conspiracy because it is not all thought out in advance. It is opportunism under the pressure of enormous forces.

Anyway, I described this scenario in broad strokes two years ago, read the updated version in The Biggest Cover-Up in History

So it's not surprising, this zoonosis hype from a virological angle. Still, the threat could have been exaggerated if they had claimed that the virus could be transmitted through the air, which is really dangerous! But that didn't happen, on the contrary. That, too, can be explained.

The why of the droplet virologists

A lab accident that causes a global disaster is disastrous for a field that thrives on virus tinkering. That game is interesting if you can do a lot of experiments and try out all kinds of things. You never know exactly what the result will be, after all, that's why you do those experiments with artificially composed (chimeric) viruses. That creativity requires leeway, and that leeway is lacking when you have to conduct research at the highest level of security. That would make everything slow and too expensive. And it might not even be allowed because of the enormous risks.

Before we go any further, let's first establish that there is no doubt whatsoever about the aerosol transmission of respiratory viruses, with a few rare exceptions, but even here it is not 100% certain. Otherwise, read the 206 references to scientific studies a piece in Science that is worth reading. Almost all of them pre-2020. Or let yourself be convinced by a simple, clear and amusing experiment from 1987(!), described in Playing poker with infections. Or read the Arguments against aerosol denial by Prof. Jimenez. Or take a look at the list below from 2015.

Aerosol knowledge dated 2015, list of aerogenic pathogens (click to view)
R.M. Jones, L.M. Brosseau, Aerosol transmission of infectious disease, J Occup Environ Med, 57 (2015), pp. 501-508

You would think that the law regulates how pathogens (pathogens) should be dealt with. When the safety of the citizen is at stake, there are generally clearly defined articles of law to be found. Think of fire safety, firearms, means of transport, you name it – but for pathogens?

There are no laws for biosafety of laboratories. There are guidelines, generally based on CDC Advisories (U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). A distinction is made between 4 security levels. At the highest levels (BSL-3 and BSL-4) the work is recognized as extremely risky and therefore attention-grabbing, expensive, slow and much less attractive.

The basic rules for BSL-3 and 4 have everything to do with airborne transmission. If there is only a risk of infection through contact or eating or drinking, then BSL-2 standards are sufficient, largely comparable to what is followed in dental practices: goggles, gloves, face masks, thorough hygiene. However, a dental practice does not work with pathogens. For this purpose, there is a special cabinet with extraction.

How dangerous aerosolized pathogens are estimated to be can be seen from the fact that even lab work with a pipette must always take place in such a sealed cabinet with extraction – because aerosols could be released when working with a pipette. Can you imagine.

Below are some excerpts from the fifth edition of CDC's "Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories." To be on the safe side, I took the last edition before the corona crisis. After all, those were the rules that applied at the time.

For example, we read there:

1. SARS is thought to be spread primarily through droplets, aerosols, and possibly fomites. The natural reservoir for SARS CoV is unknown.
2. The exact mode of transmission of SARS-CoV laboratory infection has not been determined, but in clinical settings the primary mode of transmission appears to be by direct or indirect contact of mucous membranes with infectious respiratory droplets.
3. SARS-CoV multiplication in cell culture and the initial characterization of viral agents recovered in cultures of SARS specimens should be performed in a BSL-3 facility with BSL-3 practices and procedures.
4. Inoculation of animals for possible recovery of SARS-CoV from SARS samples, studies, and protocols inoculating animals for characterization of suspected SARS agents should be performed in ABSL-3 facilities with ABSL-3 working practices.

ad 1) The natural reservoir is unknown. In the labs, they worked with SARS-CoV viruses of which they do not know their natural origin. Those viruses may have just been adopted once from a lost pizza courier, but the work is so complicated that such banalities are of course impossible to keep up with. No association with it (reminiscent of 'no active memory of.')

ad 2) The mode of transmission in a clinical setting is mainly through direct contact. That is obvious, they are not there with infected people in poorly ventilated rooms, then automatically fallen test tubes remain.

ad 3) Tinkering with SARS viruses is only allowed in BSL-3 facilities. Assessing Unknown Virus? BSL-3!

ad 4) The messing around with animals that are made (deathly) ill must be on ABSL-3. This is BLS-3 with additional facilities for animal care and safety, such as enclosed cage systems and special ventilation systems. To "keep the employees" but also the animals "safe." Don't overthink it.

ChatGPT provides a summary that corresponds well with what can be found about BSL-2 and BSL-3:

• BSL-2 Laboratories deal with agents that can cause disease in humans, but are not typically airborne in a laboratory environment. Procedures that may generate aerosols or splashes are performed within biological safety cabinets or other physical containment devices to prevent infection.
• BSL-3 Laboratories are designed for work with pathogens that can be transmitted through the air and cause serious or potentially fatal diseases. At this level, facilities implement technical measures such as specialized ventilation systems to prevent aerogenic transmission. Employees use personal protective equipment, including respirators, and work with biological safety cabinets or other containment devices when handling these pathogens.

So it is not surprising that the virologists not only adhere to the zoonosis theory but also embrace the droplet theory as the basis for infectivity. Respiratory viruses are non-aerogenic unless proven otherwise, is their adage. That's just the way it is. According to the virologists, new unknown viruses 'that we know nothing about' pass through droplets, so they don't have to not -contrary to what the guidelines prescribe- to be treated at BSL-3 level. That would be expensive and would slow things down. So those virologists couldn't go to America with that research, it was too tricky. In China, they are a bit more accommodating when it comes to bringing in the American technology with the potential to make bioweapons. So we deviated to that because research could be done there at BSL-2 level.

Clearly, this is no longer about monitoring public health. It is about monitoring 'continuity of research for the benefit of public health'. In direct messages between those involved, it is even said that the Chinese investigation, if it were to take place in America, would have to take place at BSL-4 level. Even a new BSL-4 PLUS level has been suggested.

Exploratory virological research would become practically impossible if it could no longer be done at the BSL-2 level. As a result, the bulk of the better-paid work will disappear. Virologists don't like that. They like to see how you can make bird flu dangerous for humans and whether viruses can also be built that lead to neurological disorders. Preferably by combining not-so-pathogenic virus A with a not-so-contagious virus B. The freedom of a BSL-2 lab offers that research space, even though it may well result in a virus in which the infectivity of virus A is combined with the virulence of virus B.

And if you also develop a vaccine and a test at the same time, you can count on a lot of interest. Wars are going to look very different when you vaccinate your own people and then unleash the corresponding virus on the enemy. "Protecting one's own troops".

Behind the rigidity that surprised everyone, there is a lot more than just an ingrained dogma from earlier times. It has become an omerta, a self-evident culture of silence. The droplet theory has grown out of the same soil in which the lableak was buried. It is the work pass for virologists. Thanks to the persistence of 'droplet contamination unless proven otherwise', they have been able to make a good impression with cheap research that was in many respects highly interesting for wealthy parties: pharmaceutical companies, defense and (therefore) governments. Bottomless funds could be drawn from in a self-regulatory system in which pharmaceutical-subsidized regulators thought they were important.

And the governments, the Dutch government for example? He was almost in the front row with Marion Koopmans and Ron Fouchier in the ranks, so they saw opportunities. It guarantee of health is one thing. You just have to. But it's not supervise of health suddenly offers administrators many more options, especially with an appropriate Public Health Act. That is a temptation that is difficult to resist for a director, especially for one from the D66/Rutte/WEF culture, with the coming climate disaster in mind.

The logic was completely gone. There was no critical ability to identify this. A zoonotic pandemic without air transmission is unthinkable in our Western world with clean water, good food and basic hygiene. Then the virus would have had to become aerogenic first and that didn't happen, it already was. So how can they maintain among themselves that the virus is both zoonotic and non-aerogenic? You tell me...

I asked ChatGPT again. He is often stuck because he has been trained with illogical rules. What the media listen to breathlessly is inconsistent gibberish for a computer. That's why ChatGPT got so attached at one point that influenza, which according to ChatGPT is mainly in large droplets, first had to fall to the ground in order to infect effectively, unlike corona:

But, a little later...